Consider a cyclically ordered collection of r equi-numerous agent sets with strict preferences of every agent over the agents from the next agent set. A weakly stable cyclic matching is a partition of the set of agents into disjoint union of r-long cycles, one agent from each set per cycle, such that there are no destabilizing r-long cycles, i.e. cycles in which every agent strictly prefers its successor to its successor in the matching. Assuming that the preferences are uniformly random and independent, we show that the expected number of stable matchings grows with n (cardinality of each agent set) as (n log n) r−1 . We also consider a bipartite stable matching problem where preference list of each agent forms a partially ordered set. Each partial order is an intersection of several, ki for side i, independent, uniformly random, strict orders. For k1 + k2 > 2, the expected number of stable matchings is analyzed for three, progressively stronger, notions of stability. The expected number of weakly stable matchings is shown to grow super-exponentially fast. In contrast, for min(k1, k2) > 1, the fraction of instances with at least one strongly stable (super-stable) matching is super-exponentially small.
Introduction and main results
Consider the set of n men and n women facing a problem of selecting a marriage partner. A marriage M is a matching (bijection) between the two sets. It is assumed that each man and each woman ranks all the members as a potential marriage partner, with no ties allowed. A marriage is called stable if there is no unmarried pair-a man and a woman-who prefer each other to their respective partners in the marriage. A classic theorem, due to Gale and Shapley [6] , asserts that, given any system of preferences, there exists at least one stable marriage M .
The proof of this theorem is algorithmic. A bijection is constructed in steps such that at each step every man not currently on hold makes a proposal to his best choice among women who haven't rejected him before, and the chosen woman either provisionally puts the man on hold or rejects him, based on comparison of him to her current suitor if she has one already. Since a woman who once gets proposed to always has a man on hold afterwards, after finally many steps every woman has a suitor, and the resulting bijection turns out to be stable. Of course the roles can be reversed, with women proposing and each man selecting between the current proponent and a woman whose proposal he currently holds, if there is such a woman. In general, the two resulting matchings, M 1 and M 2 are different, one manoptimal, another woman-optimal.
The interested reader is encouraged to consult Gusfield and Irving [9] for a rich, detailed analysis of the algebraic (lattice) structure of stable matchings set, and Manlove [15] for encyclopedic presentation of a growing body of a contemporary research on a diverse variety of matching problems.
A decade after the Gale-Shapley paper, McVitie and Wilson [16] developed an alternative, sequential, algorithm in which proposals by one side to another are made one at a time. This procedure delivers the same matching as the Gale-Shapley algorithm. This purely combinatorial, numbers-free, description begs for a probabilistic analysis of the problem chosen uniformly at random among all the instances, whose total number is (n!) 2n . In a pioneering paper [24] Wilson reduced the work of the sequential algorithm to a classic urn scheme (coupon-collector problem) and proved that the expected running time, whence the expected total rank of wives in the man-optimal matching, is at most nH n ∼ n log n, H n = n j=1 1/j. A few years later, Knuth [11] , among other results, found a better upper bound (n − 1)H n + 1, and established a matching lower bound nH n − O(log 4 n). He also posed a series of open problems, one of them on the expected number of the stable matchings. Knuth pointed out that an answer might be found via his formula for the probability P (n) that a generic matching M is stable:
x, y∈[0,1] n 1≤i =j≤n (1 − x i y j ) dxdy.
(His proof relied on an inclusion-exclusion formula, and an interpretation of each summand as the value of a 2n-dimensional integral, with the integrand equal to the corresponding summand in the expansion of the integrand in (1.1) .) The expected value of S(n), the total number of stable matchings, would then be determined from E[S(n)] = n!P (n).
Among other avenues of research, Knuth [11] was interested in whether the stable matching problem can be fruitfully generalized to, say, three equinumerous sets of agents, referred to as men, women and dogs. The goal is to partition the sets of agents into triples, (a man, a woman, a dog), such that [given the agents preferences] the set of triples is stable in some sense.
As reported in Ng and Hirschberg [17] , Knuth was particularly interested in the case of cyclic preferences over individual agents: each of n men ranks n women, and women only; each of n women ranks n dogs, and dogs only; each of n dogs ranks n men, and men only. We will use the notation "w 1 m ≺ w 2 " to indicate that a man m prefers woman w 1 to w 2 , and will indicate similarly the preferences of men and dogs.
Denoting the three sets M, W and D, a matching M is a partition of M ∪ W ∪ D into n ordered triples (m, w, d), each triple being viewed as a
For each agent a, let M (a) denote the successor of a in the cycle of M that contains a. [4] and Escamocher and O'Sullivan [5] conjectured that a weakly stable matching exists for every instance of cyclic preferences. Recently Lam and Paxton [13] found an instance of cyclic preferences that has no weakly stable matching.
Similarly, assuming strict preferences, t = (m → w → d → m) weakly blocks M if at least two agents a 1 and a 2 from t prefer their successors in t to their successors in M , and the successor of a 3 in t is M (a 3 ). M is called strongly stable if no t weakly blocks M .
In this paper we consider the stable matchings under cyclic preferences with r ≥ 3 sides. Here we have an ordered sequence of r equinumerous agent sets A 1 , . . . , A r ; each a ∈ A s ranks all agents a ′ ∈ A s+1 , (A r+1 := A 1 ). A matching M is a partition of A 1 ∪ · · · ∪ A r into disjoint directed cycles a 1 → · · · → a r → a 1 , (a s ∈ A s ).
M is called weakly stable (w-stable) if there is no tuple a 1 , . . . , a r of agents from the sets A 1 , . . . , A r such that
where M (a) is the successor of a in the cycle from the matching M that contains a.
Given m ≥ ⌈r/2⌉ (the least integer strictly exceeding r/2), we say that a cyclic tuple of agents a 1 → · · · → a r → a 1 weakly blocks M if at least m agents a i (strictly) prefer their successors in the tuple to their successors in M . We call M strongly stable if no cyclic tuple weakly blocks M .
We will prove Theorem 1.1. Let S n,r denote the total number of weakly stable matchings. For r ≥ 3, we have
Note. (1) Notice that c r > 0 for r ≥ 3, but, formally, c 2 = 0. As we mentioned, we had proved that E[S n,2 ] ∼ e −1 n log n, [18] , and also that w.h.p. S n,2 ≥ n 1/2−o(1) . Theorem 2.2 emboldens us to conjecture that, for r > 2, w.h.p. S n,r ≥ n γr , where γ r → ∞ as r grows. (2) We worked out a lower bound for the expected number of strongly stable matchings as well: the bound fast goes to zero as n → ∞. We conjecture that the fraction of instances with at least one strongly stable matching is vanishing as n → ∞.
Gusfield and Irving [9] and Irving [10] introduced and studied a more general stable marriage problem, with two sides of size n each, when the preference lists are partially ordered, i.e. tied entries in the lists are allowed. They defined three, progressively weaker, notions of a stable matching. (1) A matching M is super-stable if there is no unmatched (man, woman) pair such that the man and the woman like each other at least as much as his/her partner in M . (2) M is strongly stable if there is no unmatched (man, woman) pair such that (a) either the man strictly prefers the woman to his partner in M or the woman and his partner are tied in his list and (b) either the woman strictly prefers the man to her partner in M or the man and her partner in M are tied in her list. (3) M is weakly stable if there is no unmatched (man, woman) pair such that they strictly prefer each other to their partners under M . It was demonstrated in [9] that a properly extended Gale-Shapley algorithm allows to determine the existence of a super-stable or strongly stable matching for any given instance of partially ordered preferences. As for weak stability, a stable matching can be found by, first, extending each of the partial orders to a linear order, which can always be done, and in multiple ways, and, second, applying the Gale-Shapley algorithm.
The ground-breaking work in [9] and [10] stimulated an impressive research on stable matchings with partial information about the preference lists, see for instance Rastagari et al. [22] , Rastagari et al. [23] , and Gelain et al. [7] . What the author learned about the contemporary state of research in stable matchings under preferences came from reading the book by Manlove [15] , a remarkably systematic, thought-provoking, expert survey of highly diverse models and algorithms of stable matchings.
It occurred to us that as a natural, more general, version of the sequence of n independent [0, 1]-Uniforms, inducing the uniform linearly ordered preference list, one can consider the sequence of n independent [0, 1] k -Uniforms, i.e. a sequence of n points {Z (j) } j∈[n] chosen uniformly, and independently, from the k-cube [0, 1] k . Intersecting the k coordinate linear orders on {Z (j) } j∈[n] we obtain P k (n), a partial order on those n points, with order dimension k at most. As Brightwell indicated in his authoritative survey [2] , the random k-dimensional partial orders have been a subject of systematic studies since a 1985 paper of Winkler [25] , see also Winkler [26] , and "had in fact occurred in various different guises earlier".
So in this paper we consider the case when the partially ordered preferences of n men (women resp.) over women (men resp.) are n independent copies of the random partial order P k 1 (n) (P k 2 (n) resp.). Equivalently, we have the n sequences {X Let S n,w , S n,s and S n,sup stand for the random number of weakly, strongly and super-stable matchings respectively. Obviously S n,w ≥ S n,s ≥ S n,sup . Also S n,w (S n,sup resp.) is stochastically monotone increasing (decreasing resp.) with respect to (k 1 , k 2 ). We will prove two claims.
Thus, for max(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1, the weakly stable matchings are, on average, super-exponentially numerous. In stark contrast, when min(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1 as well, the fractions of problem instances with at least one strongly stable or super-stable matchings vanish at a super-exponential rate, particularly fast in the case of super-stability. Even in the most favorable case, when min(k 1 , k 2 ) = 1, the fraction of solvable instances, for either strongly stable or super-stable matchings, is exponentially small.
Cyclic stable matchings.
Suppose the n complete preference lists for agents in A s+1 by agents in A s (s ∈ [r], A r+1 := A r ), rn lists in total, are chosen uniformly at random and independently of each other. For simplicity of notations, the sets A s are copies of the set [n].
is .
Note. This Lemma extends an identity
found by Knuth [11] for the case r = 2, i.e. the bipartite matchings. An alternative derivation of (2.2) was given later in [18] . The proof of (2.1) is patterned after that in [18] .
Proof. By the definition of weak stability, we have
In words, there is no cyclic tuple a 1 → a 2 → · · · → a r → a 1 , such that each a s strictly prefers a s+1 to his successor M (a s ) in M . By symmetry, P(M ) does not depend on the choice of M . So we consider M consisting of r-tuples (i, . . . , i), i ∈ [n].
To lower-bound P(M ), we refine the probability space of the rn independent uniform preferences. Let
, be the n×n matrices whose rn 2 entries are independent [0, 1]-Uniforms. Reading the entries, from row 1 to row n, in every one of rn rows in the increasing order, starting with X (1) and ending with X (r) , we obtain the preference lists of agents from A s for agents in A s+1 , s ∈ [r]. These lists are clearly independent and uniform. Therefore
As for the events E(i) := X (1)
, they are interdependent: E(i) and E(i ′ ) are independent only if the cyclic tuples i and i ′ do not share a common edge. Fortunately, each of the events E(i) is monotone increasing with respect to X
i,j , (ı = j), remain independent upon conditioning |•, the events E(i) are positively associated (see Grimmett and Stirzaker [8] ), yielding
Taking expectations of both sides of this inequality we come to (2.1).
We use Lemma 2.1 to prove Theorem 2.2. Let S n denote the total number of weakly stable matchings. Then
Proof. To lower-bound the integral in (2.1), we switch to the rn variables
We introduce the missing u
The Jacobian of the inverse transformation is s∈[r] ξ (s) n−1 . We consider the subset Ω(n) of the region in (2.4) where
The bounds (2.5), (2.6) imply the inequalities in (2.4), with plenty of room to spare.
So, using also log(1 − z) = −z + O(z 2 ), (z → 0), and (2.7), we obtain
since β < 1/2. The top inequality comes from dropping the constraint "i 1 = · · · = i r = i 1 ". Our focus will be on s ξ (s) = Θ(n), in which case the conditions n α ≤ ξ (s) and (2.6) imply that the resulting additive difference is of order n −α log n = o(1). Therefore, by 2.1, we have: 
φ(σ) := −σ r + r(n − 1) log σ is concave, and attains its absolute maximum at σ * := (n − 1) 1/r , so that φ(σ * ) = −(n − 1) + (n − 1) log(n − 1). Now
It follows, by the standard Gaussian approximation, that if
In view of the innermost integration limits in (2.9), σ i are given by
The conditions (2.10) will easily hold if
So, uniformly for ξ meeting this condition, the innermost integral is asymptotic to (n − 1)!. It remains to estimate the integral obtained from the one in (2.9) by replacing the innermost integral with (n − 1)!, and adding the constraint (2.11) to the integration range of ξ. Introducing the new variables y (s) = log ξ (s) /(β log n), (s ∈ [r − 1]), we obtain an asymptotic lower bound for the integral in (2.9):
, and Y (s) are independent, [0, 1]-Uniforms. Pushing α toward 0 and β toward 1/2, we can make this estimate arbitrarily close to
(2) Turn to the second integral in (2.8) . Observe that
is the joint density of the lengths L 1 , . . . , L n−1 of the first n − 1 intervals obtained by throwing uniformly at random n − 1 points into the interval 
for the last equality see Pittel [18] .
Multiplying the lower bounds (2.12) and (2.13) we obtain
Note. The condition r ≥ 3 played an important role in the proof, making φ ′′ (σ * ) = −Θ(n r−2 r ) → −∞, and enabling us to claim that the dominant contribution to the innermost integral in (2.9) came from σs within a factor 1 + o(1) from σ * . For r = 2 this is not true, since φ ′′ (σ * ) = O(1).
3. Two-side stable matchings with partially ordered preferences.
We have two agent sets, A 1 and A 2 , which are copies of [n] . Suppose that the preference lists of n agents from A 1 (from A 2 resp.) for a marriage partner in A 2 (in A 1 resp.) are n independent copies of P k 1 (n) (P k 2 (n) resp.), where P k (n) is the uniformly random k-dimensional partial order on [n], Winkler [25] . (In addition, the n copies of P k 1 (n) are independent of the n copies of P k 2 (n).)
A generic P k (n) is constructed by taking k linear orders on the set [n], uniformly and independently at random, from the set of all n! linear orders, and forming the intersection of k orders. Equivalently, P k (n) can be generated by throwing n points Z (1) , . . . , Z (n) , uniformly and independently of each other, into the cube [0, 1] k , equipped with the coordinate (linear) order , and taking the order P on the n points induced by . Uniformity of Z (j) means that its coordinates Z (j) 1 , . . . , Z (j) k are independent [0, 1]-Uniforms. The k coordinate orders P 1 , . . . , P k are independent of each other, and P = ∩ k j=1 P j , whence P = P k (n). Neglecting a zero-probability event, we have
Back to A 1 and A 2 , we introduce
For each i ∈ A 1 (j ∈ A 2 resp.) the n-long sequence X i (Y j resp.) induces the random partial order P i,k 1 (n) on A 2 (P j,k 2 (n) on A 1 resp.), with all the partial orders independent of each other. That's our stable matching problem with random partially ordered preference lists.
Let M be the bijective mapping from A 1 to A 2 , such that, numerically
M is weakly stable (w-stable) if no unmatched pair i ∈ A 1 , j ∈ A 2 is such that i strictly prefers j to its partner M (i) and j strictly prefers i to its partner M −1 (j). So by (3.1), we have
Conditioned on the event
the events in the above intersection are independent. Therefore, using |• to denote the conditioning, we have
Next, M is strongly stable (s-stable) if no unmatched pair i ∈ A 1 , j ∈ A 2 is such that either i strictly prefers j to its partner M (i) and j does not strictly prefer its partner M −1 (j) to i, or j strictly prefers i to its partner M −1 (j) and i does not strictly prefer its partner M (i) to j. Therefore
Finally, M is super-stable (sup-stable) if no unmatched pair i ∈ A 1 , j ∈ A 2 is such that i does not strictly prefer M (i) to j and j does not strictly prefer M −1 (j) to i. Therefore
(1 − y j,v ) . In addition, F 2 (x, y) = F 3 (x, y) for k 2 = 1. This is not surprising since for k 2 = 1 super-stability is the same as strong stability.
By symmetry, these probabilities do not depend on the choice of a matching M . Let S n,w , S n,s and S n,sup denote the total number of weakly stable, strongly stable and super stable matchings. Then Lemma In [18] for k 1 = k 2 = 1, i.e. for the random totally ordered preference lists, we proved that E[S n ] ∼ e −1 n log n. We will analyze asymptotics of the three expectations for {k 1 , k 2 } = {1, 1}.
Observe that the two random orders on [n], of dimension k 1 and k 1 +1, can be naturally coupled in such a way that the latter is the intersection of the former and the random independent total order. Weak stability of a given matching M means that there are no destabilizing unmatched pairs, i.e. strictly preferring each other to their partners in the matching. Under the coupling, the set of pairs destabilizing M for the (k 1 + 1, k 2 )-problem is contained in the set of pairs destabilizing M for the (k 1 , k 2 )-problem. It follows that P k 1 ,k 2 (M w-stable) ≤ P k 1 +1,k 2 (M w-stable), i.e. P k 1 ,k 2 (M w-stable) is an increasing function of k 1 , k 2 .
On the other hand, super-stability of M means absence of a radically less selective set of unmatched pairs: a pair (i, j) is classified as destabilizing if neither i strictly prefer M (i) to j, nor j strictly prefers M −1 (j) to i. Under the coupling, this set is increasing with k 1 and k 2 . Therefore P k 1 ,k 2 (M sup-stable) is a decreasing function of k 1 , k 2 .
3.1. Super-stable matchings. First, let us upper-bound F 3 (x, y) defined in (3.4) . Using the geometric-arithmetic mean inequality, we have 
f k 2 (η j ). (3.9) Suppose k 1 > 1. Using 1 − ζ ≤ e −ζ and f k 2 (η) ≤ η k 2 −1 /(k 2 − 1)!, we have (3.10)
Fix a ∈ (0, 1) and write I n = I n,1 + I n,2 where I n,1 is the contribution of ξ with s := i∈[n] ξ i ≤ n a , and I n,2 is the contribution of ξ with s > n a .
Using this inequality and s − s j = ξ j , we have
where S n is the sum of k 1 n independent [0, 1]-Uniforms. So, since the density of S n is bounded by s k 1 n−1 /(k 1 n − 1)!, we drop (1 − e −Sn/k 1 ) n and obtain I n,1 ≤ γ n 1 k n 1 e cn a /k 1 n a 0 s (k 1 −1)n−1 (k 1 n − 1)! ds ≤ (γ 1 k 1 + o(1)) n · n a(k 1 −1)n (k 1 n)! ≤ γ n 2 · n n[a(k 1 −1)−k 1 ] , (γ 2 := 3γ 1 ), as (k 1 n)! > (k 1 n/e) k 1 n . Therefore (3.14) n! · I n,1 ≤ γ n 2 · n n(k 1 −1)(a−1) → 0, since k 1 > 1 and a < 1.
Turn to I n,2 . We estimate
implying that I n,2 ≤ · · · s>n a j∈[n]
Since s ≥ n a , we have
Therefore, picking γ 3 > (k 1 k 2 ) k 2 , and γ 4 > γ 3 (e k 1 /k 1 k 2 ), we have: for n large enough,
Consequently (3.16) n! · I n,2 ≤ γ n 4 n −(k 2 −1)n .
Combining (3.14) and (3.16) , we arrive at
implying (by Markov inequality) that P(S n,sup > 0) ≤ n −n min(k 1 −1,k 2 −1)−o (1) .
In words, the fraction of problem instances with at least one super-stable matching is super-exponentially small.
Consider the remaining case k 1 ≥ 2 and k 2 = 1. Here {y j,v } = y j,1 =: y j , and so Then 1 minus the random product has density ψ k (z) = log k−1 (1−z) −1 (k−1)! , (z ∈ (0, 1]), and we are back to the uniform density if k = 1. So, introducing the sequence {Z i } i∈[n] of independent random variables with common density ψ k 1 (z) we obtain that (3.17) E[S n,sup ] = n! · I n , I n :
here Y j are [0, 1]-Uniforms, which are independent among themselves and from {Z i }. Analogously to (3.10), we write
The innermost integral is (1 − e −s j )/s j ; so arguing as in (3.11)-(3.13), we obtain
Unlike the case of the uniform density, we have no tractable upper bound for the n-th order convolution of the density ψ k 1 (z) with itself. Fortunately (Alternatively, this function is the Laplace transform of the uniform density, and it is known that Laplace transform of any nonnegative function is logconvex.) Therefore
Consequently E[S n,sup ] ≤ n! I n = O(n 1/2 ρ n k 1 ), ρ k = e −1 J k . By Maple: ρ 2 = 0.8287956957, ρ 3 = 0.8287956957, ρ 4 = 0.6329102250. In general, ρ k decreases with k increasing, because 1 − u∈[k] X u ≤ 1 − i∈[k+1] X u , and z −1 e z/2 is decreasing for z ∈ [0, 1]. Therefore we have proved Lemma 3.3. Suppose min(k 1 , k 2 ) = 1 and k := max(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1. Then for n large enough we have E[S n,sup ] ≤ (ρ k + o(1)) n , ρ k decreases with k and ρ 2 < 0.83.
A sharp contrast between the bounds in Lemma 3.2 and Lemma 3.3 raises the question: is E[S n,sup ] exactly exponentially small under the conditions of Lemma 3.3? To answer positively, we need a sufficiently sharp lower bound for I n in (3.17) . We start with a bound
The constraint min Z i ≥ 1 − e −1 is imposed because the density ψ k 1 (z) is log-convex for z ∈ [1 − e −1 , 1), a property we use in the second line below. Consequently
for every α > 1 if n ≥ n(α). Thus In summary, we have proved Theorem 3.5. If min(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1, then the fraction of problem instances with at least one super-stable matching is at most n −n min(k 1 −1,k 2 −1)−o (1) . If min(k 1 , k 2 ) = 1 and max(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1 then the fraction of problem instances with at least one super-stable matching is between (r k − o(1)) n and (ρ k + o(1)) n , where 0 < r k < ρ k < 1 and r k , ρ k decrease as k increases. (3. 3)) that
We need to find a tractable upper bound for F 2 (x, y).
then the claim follows immediately. Since ℓ log(1 − z ℓ ) is concave and the range of z is convex, it suffices to produce λ ≥ 0 such that z * ℓ ≡ p 1/k is a stationary point of the Lagrange function ℓ log(1 − z ℓ ) + λ ℓ∈[k] log z ℓ in the open cube (0, 1) n . The needed λ is p 1/k /(1 − p 1/k ).
Using Lemma 3.7, we have
The bound looks promising as it depends only on 2n products P (
Introduce independent random variables X 1 , . . . , X n with density φ k 1 (z) = 1 0 e −sy α φ k (y) dy is a slightly-disguised Laplace transform of a nonnegative function, whence it is log-convex. Therefore Indeed, φ k 1 (x)φ k 2 (y) is the joint density of X , Y, the product of k independent Uniforms and the product of another k 2 independent Uniforms, respectively. So the double integral is E[e −n(X Y) α ] = E[e −nZ α ], where Z is the product of k 1 + k 2 independent Uniforms. Substituting nz α = η, we obtain that the integral is asymptotic to
Recalling that α = (k + 1)/2k, it follows that E[S n,s ] ≤ n!e n c 1 n −1/a (log n) k 1 +k 2 −1 n = O n 1/2 (log n) k 1 +k 2 −1 c n 1 n − k−1 k+1 n .
We have proved Lemma 3.8. If k := min(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1, then E[S n,s ] ≤ n −n k−1 k+1 −o (1) .
In summary, we have Theorem 3.9. If k := min(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1, then the fraction of problem instances with at least one strongly stable matching is at most n −n k−1 k+1 −o(1) . If min(k 1 , k 2 ) = 1 and k max := max(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1 then the fraction of problem instances with at least one strongly stable matching is at most 0.83 n , and at least [e 2 (k max − 1)!] −n .
Note. For k = min(k 1 , k 2 ) > 1 the fractions of solvable problem instances are super-exponentially small for both super-stable solutions and strongly stable solutions. The difference is that for the former this fraction is around n −n(k−1) , while for the latter the still minuscule fraction is much larger, around n −n k−1 k+1 . y j,v , with S n,w denoting the total number of weakly stable matchings. This time E[S n,w ] ≥ E[S n ], which is the expected number of stable matchings with random totally ordered preference lists, and it is asymptotic to e −1 n log n. E[S n,w ] is expected to grow faster with n, but how much faster? (i) Upper bound. Instead of the "hard-won" inequality (3.18), now, according to (3.23)-(3.19), we have the analogous equality from the start: Following the steps that led us to (3.22) , we obtain I n ≤ e n K n n , K n := 1 0 e −nz φ k 1 +k 2 (z) dz ∼ n −1 (log n) k 1 +k 2 −1 (k 1 + k 2 − 1)! .
We conclude that (3.25) E[S n,w ] ≤ (log n) (k 1 +k 2 −1+o(1))n .
(ii) Lower bound. Let k 1 ≥ k 2 . We start with
the constraint on max i X i being dictated by log-convexity of φ k 1 (x) for x ∈ (0, e −1 ]. As for the constraint on max j Y j , we need it to have the bound 1 − Y j X i ≥ e −αX i Y j , α > 1, β := 1 −α/α. 
